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Chapter Six 
#NotlntendedToBeAFactualStatement 
On Truth and Lies in an Affective Sense 
Christopher J. Gilbert 
Truth is nonsense. At least, in April 2011, this is what one might have been 
led to believe. On the Senate floor, then Republican Minority Whip Jon Ky! 
delivered a speech that situated the Planned Parenthood Federation of Ameri-
ca at the crux of budget disputes that were precipitating a government shut-
down. Kyl and others in his party were calling for an end to federal funding 
for the program, which in 2011 received $363 million. Said Ky!: "Everybody 
goes to clinics, to hospitals, to doctors, and so on. Some people go to Planned 
Parenthood. But you don't have to go [there] to get your cholesterol or your 
blood pressure checked. If you want an abortion, you go to Planned Parent-
hood, and that's well over 90 percent of what Planned Parenthood does." 1 
Within hours, Politifact checked the veracity of this statement, and so did 
CNN, only to discover that abortions comprised approximately 3 percent of 
Planned Parenthood's procedures, which also include cancer screening and 
treatment of sexually transmitted infections, and general women's health 
services. Politifact pronounced the statement false using its online "Truth-0-
Meter." CNN later announced the official word from Kyl's spokespeople: his 
claim "was not intended to be a factual statement." 2 
That was April 8. On April 9, a cavalcade of reports and editorials be-
trayed the senator's proverbial pants on fire. Op-ed columnist Gail Collins 
dubbed Kyl's remark "the most memorable ... to come out of politics since 
Newt Gingrich told the world that he was driven to commit serial adultery by 
excessive patriotism." 3 Steve Benen mockingly lauded Kyl's disclaimer as 
"an amazing way to justify all bogus claims-just make stuff up, and if 
anyone notices that you're not telling the truth, simply explain that your 
nonsense was 'not intended to be a factual statement. "' 4 Such nonsense 
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constitutes a logic of falsehood that would have undoubtedly amused sardon-
ic fabulist Ambrose Bierce, with its fabrication of "truth to which the facts 
are loosely adjusted to an imperfect conformity." 5 And, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, political comedians Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert adopted Kyl's 
logic as fodder for ridicule. I say most significantly not simply because 
Colbert and Stewart were so famed for their own politics of reductio ad 
absurdum, but rather because Colbert in particular, even more than Kyl, 
became the story. 
During his April 11 episode of The Colbert Report, Colbert joked that Kyl 
could not be considered "wrong" ifhe never meant to be "right." 6 This mock 
defense was dovetailed by a clip displaying pundits on Fox News attempting 
to apologize for Kyl and his absurd claim. On April 12, Colbert kept up the 
charade, announcing that he had been "tweeting round-the-clock non-facts" 7 
about the senator (such as "For the past ten years, Jon Kyl has been two 
children in a very convincing Jon Kyl suit" 8 ) complete with the hashtag, 
#NotintendedToBeAFactualStatement. He also noted that members of the 
Twitter community had been posting their own nonsensical untruths at a rate 
of 46.2 per minute~which, according to Colbert, "is the rate at which Jon 
Kyl catapults puppies into the sea." 9 Countless news outlets captured the 
magnitude of the trend. In fact, conduct a Twitter search today and you are 
sure to find the meme alive and well, especially since it has circulated be-
yond the confines of its senatorial context and become a commonplace for 
commenting on the use of lies as bases for public policy, the ethics of politi-
cal officials, the weakness of public journalism, the hypocrisies in moral or 
ideological outrage, or the banality of everyday dissemblance. Each tweet, in 
Colbert's terms, points to a politics of expressing what 'feels true" (which is 
to say that Kyl's remark probably revealed his "true" feelings), and each 
reiteration of the hashtag that does not require reference to Colbert under-
scores the pervasiveness oftruthiness as a cultural lexicon unto itself. 10 Each 
rendition also engenders the hashtag event's exemplarity within a larger 
conjuncture: the so-called era of"post-truth politics." 
Declarations that politics is somehow "post-truth," or that we have all 
witnessed the "death" of facts, 11 hardly carry the same rhetorical weight as, 
say, Friedrich Nietzsche's declaration of the death of God. Instead, they 
might signal that truth is dead as a political "god-term," 12 which indicates a 
wide-ranging anxiety about the circulation of journalistic misinformation, the 
ubiquity of pseudo-journalists in the blogosphere, the corporatization of 
news media, and the emerging idea of a need for "truth vigilantes." 13 As 
David Roberts of Grist asserts, the "key feature of the post-truth political 
landscape is that there are no longer universally recognized arbiters or refer-
ees of fact." 14 There are, of course, plenty who are ready and willing to call 
foul (consider the recent fetishization of fact-checking). 15 But truth-tellers 
today belie a crucial problematic that has less to do with truthfulness in 
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content than with "the fragility of the forms that carry truth" 16 (emphasis 
added). In other words, the matter lies in conditions of truth, which the 
rhetorical force of Colbert's comic expressions help to reveal. 
Odd as it may seem, Colbert helped crystallize a sense of these conditions 
when he coined the neologism "truthiness" in the 2005 inaugural episode of 
his political comedy show, The Colbert Report. "Truthiness" has since be-
come a cultural cliche for conveying the particularly affective investments 
that individuals or groups stake in a truth claim, rather than to the proof of its 
truthfulness as such. If, following Raymond Williams, we take keywords like 
"truthiness" seriously, we might therefore engage the problem of "post-truth" 
politics as more than the troubles of damned lies. Keywords are contact 
points for considering "certain activities and their interpretation" in public 
culture.17 Importantly, words like "truth" embody "connections of meaning" 
that quaver when they are "offered,.fe/t for, tested, confirmed, asserted, qual-
ified, changed." 18 So conceived, Colbert's quip about "truthiness" as a mode 
of "felt" politics, or a means of "feeling" truth, is not so nonsensical. Or 
maybe it is. Regardless, "truthiness" exemplifies the significance of 
(non)sense as a rhetorical affectation of truth and lies. 
This chapter unfolds with an analysis of the cultural purchase (and poli-
tics) of the word "truthiness," which, like other "problem-laden words," en-
tails clues "to changing political, social, and economic situations and needs'' 
along with the "struggle[s] in their use . .. to give expression to new experi-
ences ofreality." 19 I would add that, given the revival of professional protes-
tations for reformed checks and balances within what Lawrence Grossberg 
might call "economies of truth production," there is a sense in which certain 
keywords are vital because of their (de)legitimation in institutions and dis-
course. "Truthiness" is a marker for the perverted "fact" that lying both can 
and cannot work as a political principle, even as it functions as a foil for 
"making sense." What is more, the so-called "Age of Truthiness" names a 
moment in which many people do not seem to care about truth as such, which 
is to say that it might be misguided to assume that truth is either sought after 
or desired by a wide swathe of individuals. 
Consequently, if"truth ... is in the making," 20 it is worthwhile to ground 
an examination of the cultural values of truth production in a lexis, or "a 
measure of shared experience." 21 Gilles Deleuze serves as my foundation for 
reimagining truth not in propositions but rather between propositions and 
things-that is, expressed in a vocabulary, or lexis, for "states of affairs." 
Building on philosophers from the Stoics through Baruch Spinoza to Nietzs-
che, Deleuze provides a compelling case for understanding truth as a proble-
matic through which we structure public feelings. He also enables a view of 
nonsense as a creative animus for the construction of "falsehoods" that 
nevertheless/eel true. While many scholars have studied affect as a[fectus-
an emotional state, physical condition, embodied influence, feeling, and so 
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on-I also look at affect as an affectation: a display, pretense, or false im-
pression that shows itself in the rhetorical effects of truth and lies on public 
conduct. Hence the critical import of the aforementioned hashtag and its 
illustration of a certain threshold in the broader discourse of "post-truth" 
politics, and the controversy over Kyl as an occasion to gesture toward other 
instances in which lie detection signals the potential consequences of politi-
cal distortion. Colbert's lampoon of Kyl remains a key moment in which 
illogical or nonsensical expressions reflect a public and its problems with 
truth. Ultimately, this essay troubles digital technologies like Twitter in par-
ticular, but also (new) media in general, as a medium for wit, whim, and the 
"affective production" of truth. 22 It also takes on the rhetorical force of 
"truthiness" to consider how certain comic forms might recalibrate how we 
understand the politico-cultural conditions of truth and its consequences. 
TRUTHINESS 
One weekend in March 2012, an assemblage of journalists, legal scholars, 
pundits, hackers, whistleblowers, and advocacy organizations converged 
onto Cambridge for a conference, entitled Truthiness in Digital Media. The 
event was co-sponsored by Harvard University's Berkman Center for Inter-
net and Society and the MIT Center for Civic Media, and professed to inter-
rogate the twenty-first-century problematics of misrepresentation, informa-
tion overload, partisanship, bias, and codes of ethics, not to mention the role 
of humor in trans-media environments. In short, the symposium sought to 
recover the Lippmannesque credo of The Society of Professional Journalists: 
"To Seek Truth and Report It." 
Parodic neo-conservative and faux pundit Stephen Colbert coined the 
term "truthiness" in 2005 to identify the emotional and selfish quality of 
perceived realities, which are derived from passionate preferences rather than 
scientific, logical, or even journalistic certainties-or, in Brian Massumi's 
words, a logic of "gut feelings" and "affectively legitimated fact(s)." 23 The 
American Dialect Society named "truthiness" the word of the year (Merriam-
W ebster followed suit in 2006), 24 and the neologism was soon legitimated in 
numerous dictionaries as "the quality of preferring concepts or facts one 
wishes or believes to be true, rather than ... [those] known to be true." 25 
Despite its soft fai;;ade, "truthiness" represents a hard line between belief and 
knowledge. It also recalls an Orwellian paranoia about doublethink (which 
seems to align with groupthink in the new media environment), and thereby a 
confused field of truth claims that alternates between false impressions and 
willful trades of complicated truths for constructed lies. Furthermore, "felt" 
truths have given way to so-called "Internet truth" (in contradistinction to 
'journalistic truth"), more information but less fidelity, and what Eric Alter-
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man, Ralph Keyes, and others now call an arena of "post-truth politics." In 
tandem is a sort of rational emotivism and, contra Frederic Jameson, a wax-
ing of affect. Though some have traced the etymology of "truthiness" 
through the Oxford English Dictionary and to the 1800s (a time when it 
actually indicated truthfulness), the term emerged largely out of Colbert's 
rampant castigation of the George W. Bush administration. 26 It also came 
with a cluster of other terms, including "factinista," "wordinista" (or "word 
police"), and "no fact zone," each one reinforcing and even reifying the 
other. In 2005, truthiness formed the premise of The Colbert Report. By 
2008, vast cohorts, from pundits to social commentators to psychologists, 
were adducing truthiness as endemic to twenty-first-century US public cul-
ture, erga omnes. 
Some, for instance, speak of "red" facts and "blue" facts (in a sort of Dr. 
Seuss burlesque). The year 2012 saw a rise of "Romnesia," the outcome of 
what the New York Times columnist Paul Krugman called the "post-truth 
campaign," 27 or what others have called the "caricature campaign" 28 carried 
out by Republicans Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan. In fact, Ryan's speech at 
the 2012 Republican National Convention led many commentators to pro-
nounce "the end of political truth." 29 James Fallows of the Atlantic held 
journalists just as responsible: "When significant political players are willing 
to say things that flat-out are not true-and when they're not slowed down by 
demonstrations of their claims' falseness-then reporters who stick to he-
said, she-said become accessories to deception." 3° Fallows's indictment of 
so-called "post-truth journalism" bespeaks what Jeremy Holden has deemed 
a problem of "the entire news media," 31 which has all but repudiated its 
accountability to public opinion. It also highlights a more salient politics of 
falsification that Neil Newhouse, a lead pollster for the Romney-Ryan cam-
paign, summed up when he refused to let "the campaign be dictated by fact-
checkers."32 One consequence has been an all-out media war over false 
equivalences. 
But lest we forget an important aspect of Colbert's neologism: the suffix 
-iness. Stanford University linguist Arnold Zwicky calls it ''the Colbert suf-
fix,"33 pointing to its role as a ridiculous qualifier that nonetheless resonates 
with the condition of truth that it simultaneously purports to measure. It is 
telling that with the 2012 campaign came the institutional fetish with fact-
checking, which has evolved into an unadulterated giddiness for things like 
"falsehood face-offs." 34 Burdens of facticity lie at the root of classical con-
ceptions of truth as correspondence between information and actualities. But 
so do impressions. As Colbert told Charlie Rose in December 2006, truthi-
ness gets at the idea of "gut feelings" as measures of certainty, as catalysts of 
in-formation. Information constitutes patterns-bits of knowledge, for in-
stance, in fonn-that organize experience. Affectively, public knowledge is 
as much a matter of expression as it is a collection of facts. Truth is not 
t 
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facticity. It is feeling, or the "sharing of form [that] comprises information" 
in "the organization or communication of relationships." 3s Truthiness orga-
nizes affect, shaping judgments based on a pervasive sense that "all un-
wanted facts [are] political, uncertain, and equally debatable." 36 As such, 
truthiness is not only a felt quality but also a state(ment) or expression of 
affairs. It is a measure, by which the important suffix-iness describes as a 
stasis and, in a rhetorical sense, an instability that disrupts even as it under-
lines the status quo. So it begs a question about what to do with the proverbi-
al truism that we believe what we want to believe. If we know to be true what 
we want or feel to be true, then this question is particularly troubling when 
we imagine that the logic of nonsense, or of nonsensical truth, is an affective 
sense of reasoning insofar as it relies on the formal and even fervid ways of 
conveying thoughts and feelings-and, yes, even facts. 
One such mode of affectation is crowdsourcing. Participants at the Truth 
in Digital Media conference tentatively celebrated the power of crowds for 
"recognizing and rejecting patterns of deception." 37 Nonsense expresses or 
exposes such patterns insofar as it displays the limits of ordinary speech. 38 
Then again, the very idea that nonsense (or deception) can be simply detected 
and described follows the well-worn path of American pragmatism to affix 
truth "to our experiences of that thing and to our conversation about and 
collective understanding ofit." 39 Such pragmatism begets optimism, perhaps 
expressed most extremely by James Surowiecki in The Wisdom of Crowds, 
even as it ignores the element of trust in everyday communication. However, 
ascriptions in the digital media conference to a collective will of the Web 
were tempered by the pessimism of industry executives and intellectuals who 
"described a media landscape where roving bots produce near-human con-
versation on Twitter, where citizens cluster in right- or left-wing echo cham-
bers, and where measured, carefully presented debunking may only reinforce 
a falsehood because of quirks of human psychology." 40 A central concern 
was that publics are formed by processual (re)productions of presumed truth, 
which depend upon the manner in which people are "in-formed." The crisis 
of truth(iness) thrives, then, on predispositions toward distortion in the first 
instance even if objectivity is coveted "as the dominant ideal that legitimates 
knowledge and authority." 41 Put differently, the matter oftruthiness has to do 
with the affective force of truth effects. 
GUT-CHECKING TRUTH 
Deep as affective truth may be ("Trust your gut," says Colbert), 42 it is ex-
pressed at the surface. The surface, according to Gilles Deleuze, is the space 
of discourse, and thus the plane of serial constructions of meaning. This 
surface is both conditioned and conditioning; and to the extent that it relies 
#NotlntendedToBeAFactualStatement 99 
upon both propositions and sensations about events, it is (re)productive of 
what we might call surface affects. But from whence truth? To answer this 
question, a biography of the word is in order. 
Truth comes from the Old English triewp, meaning reliability, and the 
Old Norse, tryggo, connoting faith or confidence. Together, triewp and 
tryggo yield a sense of "truth" as a correspondence between "facts" and 
"reality," and something akin to "religious" belief. That modem understand-
ings of truth entail "true-to-life" appeals (or what Karl Popper might deem 
the least false verisimilitudes) and functional "truth-claims" to actuality (a la 
William James) is a layover from the ancients. 43 In the Platonic tradition, a 
fixation on the "accuracy of representations," the fixity of "established prin-
ciples," and the feigned attempts to report something as it "really" is drives 
the desire for an Idea or Ideal. Immanuel Kant further establishes the require-
ment for a sense of correspondence of knowledge and things (or subjects) 
known, namely by affixing to them the diktat of moral judgments (i.e., the 
"universability test"). Moreover, the Western tradition by and large trusts 
logical structures of understanding, and accepts that truth production is a 
cognitive, if not deliberative, project. And it follows John '.\1ilton in his 
sense, expressed in Areopagitica, that truth and falsehood will forever grap-
ple. 
Deleuze rejects the Platonic notion that truth is either beyond the phe-
nomenal world or outside the realm of language per se (even as he demands 
that neither reason nor facts cannot be the ultimate arbiter or auditor of 
Truth). Every truth can also be a falsehood, depending on what is or is not 
"(un)concealed. " 44 Or, following Deleuze, "Truth is a matter of production, 
not adequation," and ''truth and falsehood [are] primarily affect problems." 45 
The consequence here is at least twofold: first, truths are not only constructed 
but performed; and second, truth cannot in itself be a sort of Cartesian solu-
tion (i.e., a telos). In Nietzsche's terms, truth is "something that must be 
created and that gives a name to a process." 46 The constructed and processual 
nature of truth is inconsistent with a simple logic of representation insofar as 
it concerns the ends to which truths and lies are touched, tried, and told. 
Deleuze provides an outline for these ideas most explicitly in The Logic of 
Sense, to which I now tum. 
At the center of The Logic al Sense is a tradition that conjoins Deleuze 
and thinkers from Baruch Spinoza through Nietzsche to Foucault (not to 
mention Henri Bergson and Jacques Derrida): Stoicism. The theory of Stoi-
cism is predicated upon a "rigorous materialism that claims that only bodies 
exist. " 47 This is not to say that there is no mind; instead, it is a rebuttal to the 
transcendentalism that runs through so many Western philosophies of reason, 
rationality, and logic. These philosophies tend to elide a politics of con-
sciousness that might implicate the affective quality of truth in embodied 
experiences. A body is a force, in Deleuze's sense. It is not a fact of being. 
": 
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Similarly, a body of truths is a rhetorical force, not a sieve of facticity. 
Foucault argues similarly when he asserts that truth "is a thing of this 
world," 48 as unstable as the bodies, gestures, discourses, and more that com-
prise its effects. This means that facts matter less than forces inasmuch as the 
truth or falsity of judgments express indices of a (collective) will. Spinoza 
came earlier in codifying this idea when he posited truth as "the standard of 
itself and of the false." 49 Additionally, says Foucault, every body politic has 
"its ·general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one 
to distinguish true and false statements." 50 The flipside of this should be 
patent: if there is a "politics of truth" that combines a Stoic sense of truth as 
sense with the corporeality of lived experience, there is also a politics of 
falsehood that is driven by a human capacity for non-sense. This is precisely 
what motivates Deleuze's logic of sense. 
Sense, in Deleuzian terms, has a complex relationship with truth. For 
example, Deleuze upholds "common sense" (generally, shared knowledge 
that is presumably known by all) and "good sense" (prudence predicated on 
wisdom and rational judgment) as two expressions signifying felt truths that 
are patent in both the bodies that perform them and the networks, technolo-
gies, institutions, and discourses through which they are mediated. As "con-
ditions of truth," these senses name relations between language and events 
(i.e., ways of being, or surface affects) via the expressible (the lekton, in 
Stoicism). These relations rely upon propositional circles that involve deno-
tations, significations, and expressions, which combine to "[tum] brute fact 
into individuated significance, shared meaning into a singular effect, and 
manifestation ... into a process of becoming." 51 Yet, when "brute facts" 
replace the "rawness" of felt experience with raw data, and when "common/ 
good sense" supplants meaning (sens) as a medium for re-conditioning truth 
and lies, a naturalistic rationality emerges alongside moral goodness to pro-
duce repetition without difference. Deleuze argues that this is the very sub-
stance of cultural penchants to forestall alternative senses. So it is that he 
turns to nonsense as a site for imagining truth and falsity away from a 
"concern [for] simple designation[s], rendered possible by a sense which 
remains indifferent to it," and toward a notion that any "relation between a 
proposition and what it designates must be established within sense itself." 52 
Nonsense is the creative animus for establishing a revitalized intimacy 
with events and expressions. To borrow from Colbert, it expresses a capacity 
to "feel" truth rather than "know" it in any pure, rational way. Colbert cites 
truthiness and its encouragement of gut reactions as a public bad. Neverthe-
less, there is a sense in which Colbert himself perpetuates truthiness as an 
imaginative enterprise, recasting political circumstances in paradoxical, often 
ridiculous tenns-especially given that the condition of truth he critiques 
involves not only one who.feels something to be true but also one who feels it 
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to be true. It is the singularity to which Colbert stands opposed, and the 
selfish affectations that get attached to it. \1ore and more, "truth'' is some-
thing to be manipulated according to particular, even personalized, interests. 
"Rather than simply banning certain words or opinions outright," says Eli 
Pariser, truth will "increasingly revolve around second-order censorship-
the manipulation of curation. context, and the flow of information and atten-
tion." 53 Events and expressions might therefore increasingly contradict com-
mon/good sense. 
This is revealing when compared to Deleuze 's opposition to the absence 
of sense, which is to stay his own resistance to cultural processes that stultify 
difference within a repetitive-or what Massumi might call an "iterative"-
series. Nonsense is, primafacie. meaningless. However, consider that a non-
sensical word like "frumious" is what Deleuze dubs a ''portmanteau word" 
that carries the denotative form of "fuming" and "furious." To be sure, "the 
entire word says its own sense,'' but because of the relationship it maintains 
with "the sense of the other," it is, ipso facto, nonsense. 54 Sense, in other 
words, is a condition of, and conditioned by, non-sense in that meaning 
(sens) requires a conceptual ground (fond) in order to, well, make sense. 
Nonsense is the disruption of this ground, and also its reason for being. 
Following Deleuze, it is both regressive (because it enacts a return, or a re-
presentation, of conditions) and disjunctive (because it expresses the aporias 
in so-called logical sense). This is why Deleuze ends up defining "truth" in 
terms of a "falsity appropriate to the non-sense that it implies." 55 In this 
sense, "we always have as much truth as we deserve in accordance with the 
sense of what we say." 56 This is not to reduce truth to language or representa-
tion alone. Rather, it is to orient us toward what Delezue calls "the power of 
the false": 57 the artistic and rhetorical force of re-establishing a co-presence 
of constructed truths and their lived consequences. 
Given this conception of truth (and lies), is "truthiness" not something of 
a portmanteau word, conjoining conditions of truth with allusions to its affec-
tive apparatuses? And are words in Colbert's broader cluster such as "facti-
nista," which nonsensically expresses facticity itself as a principle to be 
followed alongside the institutionalized settings of its production, not simi-
larly expressive? Colbert expresses the surface considerations of our affec-
tive investments in truth as part and parcel of a sense of what matters. 
Additionally, he points implicitly to a Deleuzian notion of truth as that which 
"vivifies and alters a situation." 58 After all, the excess of affect is a symptom 
of its antithesis to fixed mindsets. stubborn predispositions, and oppositions 
to the very idea that a particular view might make no sense. Truth emerges 
out of trans-fonnation, which interrupts and even irrupts in sense. It facili-
tates "a suspension of affect-reaction circuits." 59 altering-by-falsifying a 
state(ment) of affairs. This is strikingly similar to what Raymond Williams 
refers to as the fabrication of "imaginative truths." 60 It also bespeaks a sense 
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that "the deliberate denial of factual truth-the ability to lie-and the capac-
ity to change facts-the ability to act-are interconnected; they owe their 
existence to the same source: imagination." 61 True: politics take place at the 
deep surfaces of collective constructions of "false" images, of fantasies. And, 
pragmatically speaking, such images are most constructively political when 
recognized for the extent to which truth collapses into the fantastical, 62 and 
when the lines between affective contents and contests over graspable tex-
tures oftruthiness become blurry at best. 
POSTING LIES AND POSING AS TRUTH 
Deleuze describes humor as "the art of the surface." 63 He also characterizes it 
as "the co-extensiveness of sense with nonsense." 64 Considering that his 
primary concern in The Logic of Sense involves the effect of events that are 
themselves affected by alterations of perspective, the work of Lewis Carroll 
is more than apt as his central case study. Carroll, after all, is famous for 
using pseudo words (think of the poem "Jabberwocky"), crafting witty 
verses, as well as developing narratives that disrupt delimitations of surface 
and depth (e.g., Alice in Wonderland or Through the Looking Glass). Inter-
estingly, just as Alice intones to herself, "what dreadful nonsense" 65 as she 
observes the words and deeds of others, one might also imagine the non-
factual world created by Colbert following the Planned Parenthood blunder 
carried out by Jon Ky! on April 8, 2011. 
Colbert is no stranger to wordplay, especially when engaging "artificially 
maintained controversies. " 66 In January 2012, for instance, he mocked Fox 
News pundits and Conservative radio hosts for accusing the Obama adminis-
tration of covering up a 2009 Alice in Wonderland-themed Halloween party. 
Colbert framed the "scandal" as "Malice in Blunderland," 67 then relayed how 
the cover-up was not, in fact, a cover-up, since the administration invited the 
White House press corps to the event and posted photos and videos on the 
government website. To "make sense" of the controversy, Colbert cited "Jab-
berwocky": 
'Twas bryllyg, and ye slythy toves 
Did gyre and gymble in ye wabc: 
All mimsy were ye borogroves; 
And ye mome raths outgrabe. 
Colbert's nonsensical logic, on the one hand, gets closer to claims to political 
truths. On the other, it posits a ridiculous attitude as a realist one. Nine 
months prior, Colbert catalyzed "the power of the false" in a manner that 
circulated the rhetorical force means for "making sense" of "affective factic-
ity,"68 or a predispositional feeling for truth as correspondent with certain 
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emotive judgments about what Bruno Latour calls "matters of concem," 69 
like faux political cover-ups. 
Aside from CNN's report immediately following his statement and Time 
magazine's eventual celebration of the senator's lie about the extent to which 
Planned Parenthood subsidizes abortion, few news agencies attended very 
closely to Kyl's remarks. Fewer still discussed the official disclaimer, in 
which Kyl expressed that his comment "was not intended to be a factual 
statement," that is. until it was picked up by Colbert (and, in all fairness, 
fellow political comedian Jon Stewart). As Ellen Scolnic of Phi/Iv.com put it: 
"The Colbert Report and The Daily Show were the only programs covering 
the story." 70 This was after Scholnic reported finding her fifteen-year-old 
son, Andy, playing games on his computer when he had indicated that he 
would be doing his homework. When she pushed him for an explanation of 
his claim, he replied with: "That was not intended to be a factual statement." 
On April 13, 2011, Politico announced that Colbert was "keep[ing] Twitter 
heat on Kyl." 71 The same day John Tomasic of The Colorado Independent 
converted what others called Colbert's "Twitter campaign" into a ''Twitter 
war" predicated upon "intentionally not factual politics. " 72 And countless 
other news agencies, columnists, pundits, and bloggers marked Colbert's 
Twitter madness. Indeed, Colbert enacted what it might mean to "feel" the 
news and so his nonsense (and not Kyl's lie) became the story-and this 
despite the sense in which Kyl 's non-factual statement was expressive of a 
seemingly rare instance of political honesty. 
Reflecting on Kyl's truthiness, CNN Contributor John P. Avlon described 
"emotional truth as more important than literal truth. It creates a political 
tower of Babel." 73 The biblical reference is apposite given the sense that 
misinformation can posit confusion as clarity, and processes of expressing 
falsehoods as inadvisable trips down so many rabbit holes. It is even more 
fitting in the context of Colbert's Twitter posts. which began to crop up from 
@StephenAtHome on April 12, demonstrating truth as an adoptive stance, or 
a pretended perspective. and thus as a series of "states, moments, or periods 
of more or less vague or muted feeling, informed by and reflecting cultural 
values, institutions, and social hierarchies." 74 Colbert, for instance. tweeted 
the following: 75 
Jon Ky! sponsored S.410, which would ban happiness. 
Jon Kyl let a game-winning ground ball roll through his legs in Game 6 of the 
'86 World Series. 
Jon Ky l's torso is covered in superfluous nipples. 
Jon Kyl is the only person who can sneeze with his penis. He calls it a 
"sneesis." 
Jon Kyl once ate a badger he hit with his car. 
Jon Kyl thinks no one can see him when he puts a paper bag on his head. 
Jon Kyl can unhinge his jaw like a python to swallow small rodents whole. 
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Jon Ky! has a shrine to Scooter from the Muppet Show. 
The list could go on-and on. Each tweet garnered multiple hundreds of 
retweets, and on April 14, Comedy Central's Indecision declared the tweets 
an Internet meme, citing inspired mimicries from a Twitter community that 
used Colbert as a catalyst for performing a more proximate relationship to 
(the falsity of) truth claims. For example, in a Twitter post on April 14, 2011, 
@SherrieGG wrote "Jon Kyl inherited all of J. Edgar Hoover's dresses," 
while on the same day, @dryfoo claimed that "Sen Jon Kyl spams me daily 
with offers for discount trepanations." Others suggested that "Jon Kyl has a 
velcro fetish" or that "Jon Kyl doesn't see the irony in egging abortion 
protesters." 76 Each tweet, either from Colbert or others, contained the hash-
tag #NotlntendedToBeAFactualStatement. Some Democratic senators were 
also reiterating the sentiment, as when New York senator Kirsten Gillibrand 
assured her colleagues that her own remark about federal funding for abor-
tions was a factual statement. 77 Today, a Twitter search reveals a rampant 
proliferation of the hashtag well beyond references to Kyl, who retired from 
the Senate in 2012. Surely there was, and perhaps still is, fun to be had in 
constituting a community through the distribution of nonsense. But it is 
worthwhile to consider whether Colbert's ruse poses more than a sense of 
truth as the repetition of lies. 
The "truth" about Kyl-and the "truthiness" in his expressions-became 
through Colbert's tweets the truth-be-told of the very systems and schemes 
of commensuration that sanction sociopolitical values as outcomes of dis-
putes over facticity. The question, for Colbert, is not whether "truth" gets 
distorted, but rather how it gets distorted, and why. It is about "the [affective 
and rhetorical] forces of untruth" 78 that make strong feelings as sources of 
cultural standards for perspectives, judgments, and truth-values themselves. 
As such, Colbert's stories are neither true nor false; they are affectations that 
cannot exist irrespective of (mis)perceptions, (mis)information, or altered 
states of affairs. Truth, in this sense, is the denuded report, the discrepancy, 
the incongruity-the distortion. Or better, truth itself is a falsification (of 
other, "established" accounts), a lie of lies. 
At least one ethical implication here has to do with the ways in which 
politically motivated truth claims are circulated through a body politic. Col-
bert seems to affect a sense in which certain truths are willed into or out of 
public existence in accordance with crude, if not stubborn, allegiances. Col-
bert earned his notoriety for lambasting the press corps and political officials 
without remorse, sometimes coarsely propagating "fake" news and embody-
ing the ostensibly institutionalized practice of lying by telling the truthiness. 
Truth is not illusion, in the Nietzschean sense; it is delusion. And with every 
lie, Colbert recasts the cultural truth-telling code of ethics as a truthy "mis-
recognition of the political logics ... organizing the world," 79 and so, a 
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mischaracterization of the conditions of truth. Truth, following this logic. is 
both embedded in and exceeds value systems and actualities, the openings 
and closures of access to feelings about facts, and the content controls that 
work to process. store, transmit, and represent "reality." 
As such, Colbert's truthiness attaches many a true word not only to jest 
but also to authority, to received systems of its production, and thus to the 
limits of a bare necessity for the "truth" and nothing but, so help us. So, too, 
does he instigate processes of making sense through nonsensical engage-
ments with rhetorical artifacts of political culture. These instigations rupture 
the organization of affect as a production of the "meaningful." the "know-
able," and the "livable." 80 They also demonstrate the extent to which non-
sense creates the grounds of sense-of meaning, of claims to truth or falsity, 
and thus to lived experiences. By injecting himself into the system and there-
fore outside of his own political box, xi as it were. Colbert over and again 
reenacts the potential for public consequences that exceed the confines of a 
particular media apparatus. Nonsense. as truthiness, thereby reveals rela-
tions, and here are some of their affectations: govemmentality is a neoliberal 
art of gobbledygook; audiences of Big Media are fact-checkers of fools in the 
low courts of public opinion; and the art of lying underscores a puerile 
politics of truth that calls hokum a problem only when the hoodwinker is 
caught. 
Nonsense can therefore alter both perceptions and states of affairs through 
wild distortions. Consider Colbert's commonplace affectations that emerge 
out of his assumption of a "false,·· pretentious character; the dizzying video-
graphic intros that comprised the opening credits of The Colbert Report; the 
outrageous references and assemblages of words, images, and ideas that 
Colbert introduced in any given episode; his "real world" exploits (e.g., his 
2010 testimony before Congress. his Super PAC ads, his campaign for presi-
dent of South Carolina, and more); and the overarching madcap approach 
that he takes to political commentary. Then there are his writings-such as 
2007's I Am America (And So Can You.1) and 2012's America Again: Re-
Becoming the Greatness We Never FVeren 't-which. with vast and varied 
expressions of political delirium, envelop readers in disorientations so char-
acteristic of Carroll's work. The point: nonsense deals in expressions of how 
and why truths and lies run through systems, institutions. discourses, political 
bodies, and bodies politic. It is a comic affectation of the dispositions asso-
ciated with words and ideas, and their sociopolitical disorganization. 
CONCLUSION: THE TEXTURE OF TRUTH 
Colbert's Twitter campaign against Ky!, and his wider nonsensical antics 
besides, expresses a sense in which many of "the old arbiters" of truth are 
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unfit in the "increasingly disaggregated media ecosystem. " 82 A so-called 
"post-truth" era, then, does much less to inaugurate a condition of untruth 
than it does to name-as did the neologism "truthiness"-a changing set of 
relations in the organization of truth and lies. Additionally, with these rela-
tionalities there has emerged an odd dynamic of communication, circulation, 
and regulation as protocols of truth production. 83 This is not to say that "old" 
arbitrations cease to exist. 84 However, it is to say that cultural expressions of 
truth and lies are immanent to institutional machineries, both of which affect 
and are affected by one another. It is therefore less the case that mechanisms 
for determining truth are absent referees than it is that they are sublimated 
within deeper cultural practices of, in this case, circulating public sentiment. 
In this light, I conclude with a briefreflection on the "vitality oflanguage" as 
it is emergent in the "different formations and distributions of energy and 
interest" 85 relative to the textures-or the feelings and structures-of truth 
that seem to betray a need for more and more nonsense, and more and more 
affectations of its surfaces, or its truthiness. 
I begin with Donald Trump. From the outset of his 2016 presidential bid, 
the real estate tycoon was widely recognized for his cavalier relationship 
with truth. This relationship even earned him the reputation as a walking, 
talking prototype of truthiness. 86 It also won him the position as GOP front-
runner, and this despite what many called his vicious, bigoted, and hateful 
rhetoric. 87 In fact, there is a strong case to be made that Trump-not unlike 
Colbert-gained popularity because of the "topsy-turvy, truthy" political mi-
lieu he exhibited. 88 Belief over accuracy, egomaniacal insults over honest 
ideas, politics as resolute anti-politics: these are but some of the tenets of the 
Age of Truthiness. Unfortunately, these are the very tenets that underlie a 
mass shooting that took place at a Planned Parenthood clinic on November 
27, 2015, in Colorado Springs, which countless citizens, commentators, and 
public officials alike attributed to the "hateful rhetoric" of ireful pro-lifers. 
Trump dismissed the notion that incendiary or inflammatory language can 
incite violence, no doubt because his own brand of truthiness is akin to the 
same moral enmity that contributes to a cultural politics of truth and conse-
quences, of false accounts and harsh punishments. The hook here is not that 
truth and feeling are somehow separate but rather that they are as interlocked 
as they are in tension with one another. In this sense, affective leanings 
toward things like anguish, disgust, resentment, and other ill feelings can be 
the sources, and not simply the outcomes, of so many grapples between truth 
and lies. 
There is thus a problem with the prevailing delusion that truthiness is 
comparable to facticity. As Edward Schiappa notes, truth has never been a 
matter of correspondences between, say, rhetoric and reality; instead, it has 
been constituted by a shared sense that expressions of "interrelated beliefs, 
values, and concepts" are somehow appropriate given the political, cultural, 
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and other orders of the day. 89 Put differently, what matters is how truths are 
used and expressed, not what they "really" are. The paradox is that one can 
lie and still be honest, showing forth a truth deeper and more complex than 
that caught in the ostensive conflict between fact and fiction. This truth is an 
affectation of felt verity, and it does more to display the textures of truth and 
lies (i.e., the feel of their appearance in public communication, their basis in 
political structures, their grating characteristics, their fabrication) than any 
test of reality as such. What is more, while this fonn of affective truth might 
indicate unethical or even ignorant bluster at best and, at worst, what Fou-
cault might call a "crisis of democratic institutions" (or "bad politics"), it also 
serves as a vital reminder that correspondence itself can be a clever decep-
tion. As even Hirgen Habermas admits, truth is only as good as it is an organ 
of publicity. 90 
At stake here is a sense that there is no such thing as unforced truth. 
Following Deleuze, truth is deeply embedded in the rhetorical forces of 
public life, and thus the manner in which certain conditions of truth take hold 
(or not). But to get at the textures of "deep truths" is not to dwell on discur-
sive frameworks at the expense of a profound appreciation for the depths of 
feeling. 91 Instead, it is to see truth as felt, not as framed. It is to see facticity 
as fabulated, not as tested. What truthincss exposes is that the biggest lie we 
can tell ourselves has to do with the idea that truths are somehow at a remove 
from either expressions or experiences. In this sense, #NotlntendedToBeA-
FactualStatement is actually an intensely textured statement about how truth 
and lies exist in the relations that sustain cultural politics or tear them asun-
der. To bring the rhetorical force of feeling (over facticity) to the fore, in 
other words, is to bring the real matters of concern-that is, the common sets 
of perceptions and values, and the forms of foreknowledge and predisposi-
tions, however (non)sensical they might be-to the surface. 
Here is where the twain of sense and nonsense meet: in the particular 
logic to truthiness. Of course, its own truth lies in the fact that truthy affecta-
tions are, in situ, pathologies, which is to say expressions of experiences or 
feelings. Truthiness, at base, provides a site for considering the organs of 
provisional truths, and I mean provisional in the rhetorical sense such that 
affect is the proviso and affectations are the logia of how and why truths are 
touched, touching, and, ultimately, tampered with. In these ways, while many 
theorists and thinkers have pointed to concepts of postmodemism and anti-
essentialism as fodder for the love of lies, they have also advanced a misrec-
ognition of the loss of Truth for its reconfiguration. Figures like Derrida, 
Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and others provide a complex logic for 
abandoning notions of truth that rely upon accurate representations. And 
figures like Richard Rorty advocate for abandoning notions of truth altogeth-
er. But within the express politics behind claims to Truth's impurity is a 
historical transition that "has to do with a change not so much in what we 
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believe as in how we believe." 92 For my part, the proclaimed transition to 
"post-truth politics" is not about moving beyond Truth, but rather delving 
deeper into its political expression. 
To push on Deleuze's own logic, recent pursuits of truth are not only 
(perhaps more than ever) caught up in the paradigm of mapping statements 
onto claims to fact and reality, but they are also striking at the branches of a 
social problem that has nonsensical roots. From a "logical" perspective, po-
litical truth has less to do with what the truth "is" than how it is made so. It is 
a matter of why lies matter within particular "regimes of political truth" 93 
and "structures of reputation and/or credibility." 94 Some might conceive as 
nonsensical the very idea that certain machinations could determine truth or 
control which truths are made accessible (or not). Once they become co-
determinant and thereby co-extensive, though, there is perhaps new meaning 
ascribed to a notion of truth by design. Such a truth seems to belie a politics 
of saving face. This is not to say that dissemblance and deception are goods 
in themselves. It is to say, though, that there are potential social and political 
dangers that come with "naked accountability" across the board. 95 Colbert 
denudes the pretense of pure and simple truth; then again, he also sheds the 
notion of a pure and simple lie. In so doing, he demonstrates nonsense as an 
effect of false appearances, and yet an affectively organized cause of particu-
lar modes of understanding. 
To be fair, some turns to the wisdom of crowds indicate that the boundar-
ies between truth as authored and truth as authorized (or even authenticated) 
are unstable at best. Colbert reveals the crowd as it is affected by political 
distortion. There is a difference, in other words, between the commercially 
interested deployment of truth claims and the collective consequences em-
bedded in conditions of truth production. The difference with Colbert's non-
sense and, say, much of the twaddle of political talk is that the former re-
stores an anti-common sense to the surface of political speech in the form of 
humor. Colbert lies all the time. Yet, as evidenced in the proliferation of 
#NotlntendedToBeAFactualStatement, his lies affect truth while putting on 
display the effects that organized lies have as material impressions. In a 
popular sense, Colbert contributes to the reorganization of public relations to 
truth and lies by subjecting content controls to nonsensical twists. He creates, 
a la Alice, a world of nonsense, and in so doing troubles the technologies for 
managing perceptions, perspectives, and interpretations. Tellingly, though 
Deleuze viewed humor as an artful means of bringing matters of affect to the 
surface, he also saw it as a simultaneous way to return them to their depths. 
Truthiness is therefore diabolical because it posits truth as the emptiest of 
signifiers, waiting not for discursive content but rather for feeling. 
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